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Abstract 
Recent scholarly contributions have sought to integrate Bourdieusian sociology with 
criminology, centring for example, on the ‘street’ field as a symbolic and narrative 
space occupied by players within criminal justice. This article complements this broad 
objective by focusing on the changes in contemporary police and security governance 
that are pointing towards an emerging security field. Such a change can be read from 
the literature on plural policing and crime control, and involves the morphology of 
policing into nodes or assemblages of security producers. While there has been some 
attention to the formation of security networks, further empirical work is required to 
map the field dynamics using a Bourdieusian toolkit. This article explores the concept 
of the security field, presents some observations from current field research, and 
identifies some remaining questions and challenges for further conceptualisation and 
empirical research. 
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Introduction 
There is an growing wave of scholarship using Bourdieu’s conceptual toolkit in 
criminology in studies of ‘street habitus’ as a survival craft (Sandberg and Pederson, 
2009); on processes of incorporation and resistance as ‘street social capital’ (Ilan, 
2013); and more recently still this potential Bourdieusian turn has seen the conjoining 
of narrative as ‘street talk’ which binds elements of the ‘street field’ where both 
practice and structure take place (Sandberg and Fleetwood, 2016). A significant 
contribution, developing the concept and outlining the parameters of the street field 
has also been presented by Shammas and Sandberg (2016). This latter contribution is 
especially significant for conceptualising the ‘street’ as a heuristic for analysing the 
power dynamics between the dominant juridical field and the space occupied by 
offenders and criminal justice actors. One route to strengthening such a frame is to 
consider the practices in non-juridical institutions, civil and private actors, together 
with and ongoing transformations in policing. This would mean grasping the issues 
that have long since been raised about the transformation of police from the 
bureaucratic organisation to security governance as a contemporary process. 
 
This article aims to widen and deepen the utilization of Bourdieusian sociology within 
criminological theory and research by integrating Bourdieu’s concepts with the 
significant literatures on the related issues of plural policing, crime control, urban 
security, crime prevention, and security networks that have risen to prominence 
within the frame of security governance. The argument is formed from the idea that 
the security field is the result in changes in the police field– a central institution of 
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modernity which is itself morphing into a variety of specialised control institutions, 
shifting the nature of hierarchical organisation of security to one that is captured 
primarily in a ‘nodal’ or networked model (Wood and Shearing 2007; Loader and 
Walker 2007; Schuilenburg 2015). At this juncture, both Bourdieusian theory and 
analytic method have merit for applying fresh thinking tools to this emerging field, as 
it potentially allows us to map the constellation of new players and gain a more 
critical standpoint from which to view their strategies for position. 
 
The application of sociological theory to security is as yet an underdeveloped and 
decidedly untidy business. While there has been a growing literature within 
criminology drawing from Bourdieu’s theory and methodology, there has been little 
account yet of the formation of security production which is forming as a major 
capital interest in these times (Rigakos, 2016). The field conceptualisation of security 
has however, gained some traction recently in the work of Diphoorn and Grassiani 
(2016) who put forward a processual-relational model for the way in which different 
forms of capital are used to strategise to gain field position. Adding to these efforts, 
this article seeks to explore the ‘field’ conceptualisation of security, and in the 
process, to write Bourdieu further into criminology. After a brief sketch of Bourdieu’s 
concepts of field, capital and habitus, the article outlines and critically discusses some 
uses of the field concept in criminology focussing on two key areas: the police field; 
and the street field. The article then considers the case for thinking about a security 
field, drawing from realist critiques and cases showing crime control to be highly 
nuanced and ‘geo-historic’. The growth of plural policing is then considered and some 
of the implications for a field conceptualisation and analysis of security governance 
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are outlined. Some early observations are set out from ongoing field research that 
shed light on the security field in one national context. 
 
Field Theory and Criminology: Writing Bourdieu In 
Bourdieu’s concept of field is both a theoretical device and an analytical method and 
is best understood as the competitive arenas in which actors with distinct types of 
capital, compete to achieve position. Capital includes economic capital which has to 
do with flows of wealth, profits and finance; cultural capital which stems from 
particular forms of knowledge, credentials and information; and social capital which 
accrues from networking and group membership. Society is conceived in this way as 
being structured by a series of intersecting and relatively autonomous fields (e.g. 
educational, artistic, juridical). As a tool of analysis, this helps to map the system of 
positions and the process of position takings (Bourdieu, 1977) in any field. Based 
upon the possession of symbolic capital an actor or an institution can occupy a 
position of power in a field: dominant actors possess the authority to set forth the 
system of classification that will place a value on the capital possessed by all other 
actors in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Fields overlap as arenas of ‘play’ 
and contestation where each of us as an actor in a field develops an illusio, or an 
appreciation of the rules and a feel for the game to be played in that field. As 
individual actors, we are all socialised into the logics of fields through our initial and 
ongoing socialisation where we embody the dispositions, referred to by Bourdieu as 
the habitus, that will determine how we engage in a field. Bourdieu (1977) defines 
habitus as a ‘structured structure’ whereby individuals with the same field position 
will have a common internal imprint that determines how they act or ‘practice’. 
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Habitus is also a ‘structuring structure’ as we limit our field position based upon our 
acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’ of the field(s) in which we participate.  
 
To bring field theory into criminological focus, two contemporary applications are 
discussed further: the ‘police field’ and the ‘street field’ however a further critical 
distinction between fields is necessary. First, Bourdieu (1994) had shown how the 
modern state had formed as the ‘bureaucratic field’ and inherited the stock of statist 
capital from the dynastic state. It retained forms of cultural capital as the 
centralisation of knowledge from auditing, mapping and revenues. Principally it 
inherited a monopoly in the nomination of officials with credentials and with it to 
distribute and manipulate public goods. Second, operating as a ‘meta-field’ Bourdieu 
delineated the ‘field of power’ as comprised of economic and political elites operating 
in and beyond the state. All fields compete with each other to get close to the field of 
power. 
 
Bourdieusian Sociology and the Police Field 
In her study on police socialisation and police occupational culture, Chan (2004) drew 
attention to and elaborated upon the police field, pointing out that this field is not 
static. Changes in policy and regime outside of the police field reduces the symbolic 
power of the police as they ‘can impact on the values of different forms of capital as 
well as what counts as symbolic capital’ (Chan, 2004: 346). Chan explicates how the 
‘police habitus’ was best understood as a type of cultural knowledge held by police 
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officers, to manage themselves in particular situations but also to gain greater position 
in the police field. 
 
Bourdieu himself did not give any clear sense of where the police as a politico-
juridical institution fits into social and symbolic space: we can position it by 
imagining the police to be part of the field of power, the juridical field and the 
bureaucratic field. Bourdieu’s (1987) paper on the juridical field positions the police 
as a dominated servant, as a legal agent providing a service to the law but without 
power within the field. Chan (1996, 2001, 2004) however has empirically 
demonstrated the existence of a police field, as a separate, relatively autonomous 
space from the field of power and the bureaucratic field. Much of the work of police 
is not centred on criminal justice processes but on more mundane procedural, safety 
and administrative tasks (see Bayley, 1985; Reiner, 2010). We can infer that the 
police field is not part of the field of power as revealed in documented cases of 
clashes and struggles for autonomy between police, the state and politics (Bayley and 
Stenning, 2016). 
 
Chan (2001) has provided a significant insight into the space of the police field, based 
largely upon a zoom-in on police culture. A conceptual and empirical challenge 
remains to zoom-out beyond the immediacy of the police field and to assess its 
position in the system of positions with other fields, and how it vies with them for a 
stake in the bureaucratic field, and for sustenance from the field of power. Such a 
wider focus might result from looking at the question of security governance in a 
newly pluralised landscape comprised of new ‘assemblages’ of security 
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(Schuilenburg, 2015) or ‘security networks’ (Dupont 2004). Shifts in policing models 
and the widening of actors taking security roles, disrupts the police field and sets off 
new struggles for power, position and domination. 
 
The introduction of new police structures, stronger demands for accountability, for 
oversight, the closure of traditional police stations and the use of technical civilian 
workforces are creating new challenges in the police field. On this note Fraser and 
Atkinson (2014) examined the rise of intelligence-led policing and the impact of 
specialised expertise in interpreting police knowledge on gang membership. Police 
driven data they point out, gets misinterpreted by civilian police analysts leading to 
the mis-labelling of young people as gang members. However, the introduction of 
new police actors, while presenting a challenge to the police field and introducing a 
‘new sensibility’, has not shifted the dominance of the police habitus. Fraser and 
Atkinson (2014) also demonstrate the implications of introducing wider actors in the 
police field, imposed perhaps by the growing pluralisation of policing and policing 
beyond the police (McLaughlin, 2007). It further demonstrates the space created by 
external changes that drive new models of policing, creating morphologies with the 
police field.  
 
The Street Field 
With the aim of including in field analysis those upon whom there is a criminal justice 
gaze, Shammas and Sandberg (2016) have conceptualised the street field – a space 
that concerns crime, criminals and street gangs who are in a struggle against the 
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juridical field (laws, judicial authority). Juridical power defines the field by passing 
laws that shapes and dominates the ‘street’. The street field they argue, best captures 
specific crimes rather than all crimes: drug distribution rather than white collar 
‘crimes in the suites’. The street field is not independent but semi-autonomous and yet 
depressed and subordinated, the boundaries of which are shaped by the bureaucratic 
field: differentiated positions are determined by how actors view classification (drug 
categories are the given example) as a system of ‘vision and division’; street habitus 
is the effect of position in the field (Shammas and Sandberg, 2016).  
 
The merit of the street field concept is its capacity to capture the relationship of 
domination between juridical field and the face-to-face interactions with criminal 
justice within this social space. Furthermore, it has merit by allowing us to specify 
who constitutes the supposed ‘threats’ in the public sphere – drug users, homeless 
people, beggars and unlicensed street traders, drug dealers especially as these groups 
constitute a risk to social order and to commercial interests. Such risk constructions 
bring about the space of security production in respect, for example, of types of 
classification of distinct types of actor: victim, nuisance, perpetrator, protector and so 
on. Hence it is possible to imagine a new formation within social space involving a 
wider range of actors. Considering such processes as part of a security field, enables 
us to explore the relations between these new actors: private security companies for 
example are increasingly enrolled as providers in a growing number of public 
domains and joining wider assemblages or security networks as ‘force capital’ 
(Martin, 2013). These complicating factors are essential to the fuller formation of a 
Bourdieusian criminology as there is a need to explore the mediating roles of actors 
involved in governing through categorisation and surveillance. While the street field 
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concept is compelling it is a less clear in accounting for the transformations in the 
police field and especially for how we account for its division into a profusion of new 
bodies now involved in the process of security production. 
 
A wide and deep definition of security is required to encompass formal police or 
bureaucratic policing (Reiner, 2010); private security; and civic security as modalities 
widely discussed within criminology as plural policing (McLaughlin 2007); as nodal 
security (Shearing and Wood, 2003); crime prevention and community safety 
(Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes, 2007); ‘everyday’ security (Crawford and 
Hutchinson, 2016); and urban security governance (Edwards and Hughes 2013). 
Critical here is the idea that the field of power through the state nominates, mobilises, 
trains, resources and capacitates a range of market, civil and public organisations in a 
‘programme of security governance’ (Schuilenburg, 2015). Emphasising only the 
police field or the street field give an incomplete picture without reference to the 
intermediary field players involved in security governance and governing through 
security. Essential to the analysis of this process is an account of the struggles, 
resistances and practices that shape the emerging security field. 
 
Security Governance as a Nuanced Field of Practice 
Much of criminological discourse on security governance and related areas such as 
crime prevention and community safety, has been critiqued through a neo-
Foucauldian lens, emphasising this shift in terms of pastoral power and as the bio-
political programme upholding the project of the self. The governance of crime was 
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seen as part of a neo-liberal, post-welfare biopolitics and involved an extending 
repertoire of modes of self-government or ethico-politics (Rose, 1999) in which state 
power had become ‘de-centred’ and part of a wider ‘discursive field of action’ (Rose 
and Miller, 1991). Thus it was observed that late modern society was characterised by 
punitive populism and the rise of a culture of control (Garland, 2001) 
 
Empirical evidence however revealed that this new field of action was a little messier 
and geo-historically patterned based upon professional resistance, practice traditions 
and regional governance and involved demands to re-shape security governance from 
below as well as above; and into which the state had to re-insert itself (Lea and 
Stenson, 2007). Developing an interpretation of these patterns within a critical realist 
frame, Hughes (2007) and Edwards and Hughes (2005) pointed out that social 
relations of crime control operated in open systems that are subject to change, 
variation and struggle because human agents are reflexive.  
 
Such an approach provides a bridge to the specification of field dynamics as an open 
system. Power, rather than operating in a simple domination-subordination 
dichotomy, is richly nuanced and subject to space and time variation. Case studies 
have provided significant empirical evidence to show this geo-historic specificity that 
works within the field of security governance. Gilling et al (2013) in their analysis of 
urban security across Ireland and the UK argued that the so-called neo-liberal model 
of crime control said to dominate the Anglophone world can be shown to be 
regionally diverse, calling on policy talk, decisions, action and political traditions. 
Case studies also reveal that rather than being derived from neo-liberal discourse, 
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state actors working in the bureaucratic field, reveal the capacity to embed social 
practices by knowing how government works and knowing who in government can 
achieve results (Cherney and Sutton, 2004; Bowden, 2017). In short, for realist 
authors, the form of governance in security and crime control takes place in a highly 
differentiated and contested field, and for our purpose, depends upon practice that 
flourishes irrespective of the dominant discourse.  
 
Bourdieu has not been considered widely as contributing to a theory of governance 
but given the political nature of Bourdieu’s (2014) work on the state and its 
relationship with dominant classes, it becomes easier to connect field dynamics to the 
logics of governing (Swartz, 2013). In this sense field might also be used to capture 
the new positions and the process of position taking, in both hierarchies and in 
network forms of security production and organisation, within the state and beyond 
the state. 
 
Locating and Imagining the Security Field 
At this point in the article there is a need to take account of the structural changes 
giving rise to the formation of a security field. Critical here is the relative uncertainty 
and risk profuse conditions of late modern society, together with the fracturing of the 
bureaucratic field. The article considers the ‘nodal’ concept of security governance 
and evaluates various scholarly contributions alluding to the formation of a security 
field. 
 
  12 
The Decline of Bureaucratic Police: Plural Policing and the Nodalisation of Security 
Major social transformations in contemporary society and work have been identified 
as driving the formation of the new space of security production: theories of 
modernity at the fin de siècle stressed the rise of ontological insecurity (Giddens, 
1991) surrounding the liquefaction of ‘solid’ institutions of modernity (Bauman, 
2000). Similarly Jock Young (2007) has described late modernity as a new period of 
uncertainty captured by a dizziness where culturally and structurally excluded classes 
live in relatively close proximity to one another except across new abstract 
boundaries. These new boundaries are upheld by the growing forms of purchased 
security in the shape of locks, gates and CCTV (Young, 1999). But it is the late 
modern state and its withdrawal from the direct production of public goods that drives 
a new pluralisation, as the state withdraws to a steering role in the production of 
public goods (Braithwaite, 2000). Almost two decades after this shift from 
government to governance was noted within the criminological literature, of the 
emergence of a new field stemming from the changing security landscape, as state 
policies fracture centralised systems for producing security. 
 
Loader (2000) introduced his analysis of the growth of plural policing as constituting 
direct provision of policing by the police body but also the rise of private security 
providers together with civic production of security outside of the state. Since then, 
internal security fields have become fragmented by globalisation as local and national 
police forces are required to police globally produced risks. Hence we have to 
consider the impacts and new formations arising from the decline of police 
bureaucracies, and the opportunities and struggles it sets off. 
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Alongside the literature on plural policing has run the concept of ‘nodal security’. 
This was based upon the analysis of the role of civil society in constructing peace and 
civility where the state is absent or where citizenship bonds are fragile (Froestad and 
Shearing, 2012; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Debate in this literature pivoted around 
the role of the state in moderating a security field. Loader and Walker (2007) argued 
that the state withdrawal from having a monopoly in security results from scepticism 
on the right (concerned with the financial burden), and the left (over the extension of 
the authoritarian reach of the state). The state is a necessary virtue they argued in 
respect of deliberation and regulation of security producers. The state therefore 
anchors security rather than dominates it – by retaining priority rather than a 
monopoly – a ‘state-anchored pluralism’. 
 
A further contribution from Schuilenburg (2015), who draws from a wider conceptual 
frame by combining Foucault, Deluze and Tarde, offers a theoretical and empirical 
account of security assemblages as temporally limited, fluid arrangement of 
‘territories, rules and authorities’, operating in the shadow of hierarchies, ‘in the 
middle’ where there is an ‘indeterminacy of the elements, relations, and an open 
structure’ (2015: 127). As Schuilenburg puts it: ‘The middle precedes such forms of 
ordering. In doing so, the middle forms the basis from which relations develop and 
elements from various practices attach themselves to one another to form new 
combinations’ (2015:129). Citing Castells (1996) on the network society he points out 
that these new constellations operate in a shadowy space and are difficult for states to 
regulate just like informational flows: Schulienburg’s ‘assemblages’ constitute a 
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messy ‘hybrid security model’ that has detached itself from state control since the 
1980s.  
 
While Schuilenburg rightly points to the exclusionary potential of such nodal 
assemblages, a further analysis of the material and symbolic strategies of different 
actors in constituting such spaces would provide a more complete picture of the 
constitution of the field itself and the specific categories ranked by access to security 
as a form of cultural capital. Absent is an account of struggles and contestation for 
positions in security governance. 
 
The rise of plural policing and the nodalisation of security is therefore symptomatic of 
the late modern state as a bureaucratic field in decline: a widening of the constellation 
of producers creates a rupture in what Bourdieu (1993) called the system of 
possibilities in that it changes the stakes and profits of the police field and the 
distribution of economic and symbolic profits to non-state actors. The growing 
complexity in risks and threats has created demand for new areas of expertise, and 
take the organisation of security beyond the capacity of the public police. Witness for 
example the EU Horizon 2020 programme under the societal challenge ‘secure 
societies’ and the emphasis on stimulating consortia on counter measures in cyber 
security, cyber terrorism, threats to critical infrastructure, radicalisation and 
trafficking (European Commission, 2018). In itself this is stimulating universities, 
enterprises and specialised expertise consultancy in security and relative redistribution 
in the space of possibilities and, therefore the distribution for new positions to be 
taken with the chance of unfreezing the rigidity of the police field.  
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The Field Concept of Security 
Capturing this wider constellation of security players, some extant contributions have 
sought to utilize the field concept, with varying levels of theorization using 
Bourdieusian concepts. The first is based upon the idea of ‘multiple security fields’ in 
which security might be understood as relating to how urban metropolises are policed 
at strategic and operational levels (Devroe et al, 2017). In this framework city-regions 
are integrated into European, national and / or metropolitan fields which in turn 
predicates the shape, convergence or divergence, of policing strategies. Drawing upon 
the idea of circuits of power, Devroe et al (2017: 14) distinguish the idea of 
dispositional power or particular orientations, for example military style, community 
policing, zero tolerance, orientations, that are reproduced by the advancement of 
particular dispositions by the strategic suppression of others. Hence the security field 
logic sees the inclusion and exclusion of new actors within the dynamics of what 
Bourdieu (1993) called ‘the principle of hierarchy’ as dominant players protect their 
positions. 
 
Linking the study of multiple security fields to Bourdieu’s ‘semi-autonomous fields’, 
this perspective has merit for it demonstrates a methodology for comparative security 
field analysis in urban metropolitan regions. However its use of the Bourdieusian 
sociology is only partial, under elaborated and selective: where the struggle for capital 
might fit for example remains underdeveloped. 
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A most relevant and significant contribution to theorising the security field has been 
made by Dupont (2004) who put forward a four-fold typology of security networks 
concerned with how new security assemblages form in the context of the pluralisation 
of the policing field. Dupont writes of ‘the field of security’ and without articulating 
and conceptualising field in the strictly Bourdieusian sense, but is implied in that 
Dupont’s framework pertains to ‘positions’ or locations relative to ‘ties’ or 
relationships. Local security networks tend to comprise traditional agents of social 
control and typical community safety initiatives. Institutional networks constitute 
intra-governmental arrangements between agencies on the achievement of common 
goals. International security networks ‘without borders’ are typical of co-operation 
between police forces and could include private agencies. Finally informational 
networks defy both time and space as they are concerned with the sharing of 
information between databases. Whelan and Dupont (2017) proposed the expansion 
of the typology to include four functional networks: information exchange; 
knowledge generating; problem-solving; and co-ordination networks.  
 
Dupont brings together his thesis under nodes, positions and capitals to theorise the 
dynamics of networks. First he outlines the within-network strategies where agents 
strive to shore up and dominate the stock of capital and then have that recognised by 
other members of a network. The unequal distribution of capital generates the division 
between dominant and dominated or a struggle between the established orthodox and 
the new ‘heterodox’ field actors. Different forms of capital (social, economic, 
political and symbolic) constitute a set of strategic assets in Dupont’s framework. 
Police organisations are high in political capital but private security firms are low in 
political capital. Police expert knowledge constitutes a form of statist cultural capital 
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in this context. Finally these forms of capital culminate in symbolic capital which has 
typified the dominant and legitimate positions of police organisations. But citing 
police scholars Dupont rightly observes that this appears to have peaked and failures 
in the police have seen an erosion of its symbolic capital.  
 
Dupont (2004) has set the foundations for a Bourdieusian inspired sociology of the 
field of security with emphasis on the integrating dynamics of habitus, capital and 
symbolic power. Critical is the framing of the field as practices competing with each 
other and the morphology of the field as established actors (rear garde) versus the 
newcomers (avant garde) (Bourdieu, 1984), and hence the need for an analytic frame 
to capture the generation, constitution and internal dynamics of the security field. 
 
The Formation of a Security Field: the Case of Ireland 
Answering Dupont’s (2004) call to conduct empirical work on the field of security, 
this section presents a series of linked case studies drawn from ongoing field research 
on security assemblages in the Republic of Ireland. After some initial context, this 
empirical section outlines the sub-national networks in cities and local communities; 
the formation and the historically dominated position of private security; national 
police-led crime prevention as field action that centres on the formation of a security 
doxa (commonsense); and the position and actions of the central government acting as 
the bureaucratic field.  
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The study was based upon a series of interviews with key security actors, together 
with participant observations in public settings and events. After initial meetings, field 
observations and interviews with security actors, transcripts and fieldnotes were 
analysed to identify other actors named as existing within a system or network of key 
actors. These actors were then interviewed. This followed a method used by (Blanchet 
and James, 2012) for building accounts of actor relationships and the structure of 
relational systems. Hence actors who participated in the study helped to map the field 
by referring the researcher to proximate and associated actors, indicating network 
knowledge and reciprocal, relational links. The fieldwork began with the government 
officials and graduated towards urban security actors; private security industry actors; 
local community safety personnel; and key police actors. A final subsection of the 
article summarises the cases and sets out some features of the emerging security field 
resulting from shifts to a more pluralised policing model.  
 
The Irish Context: Police Morphology and the Habitus 
The Irish police force, An Garda Síochána has had a key role in nation building 
(Conway, 2014) and has been characterised historically by a rural habitus: a 
commonsense that enabled it to embed itself in communities, to be fostered in lay 
Catholic and sporting associations; it dominated the field with this localist, 
monocultural and heroic habitus (O’Brien-Olinger, 2016). According to Bowden 
(2014) this habitus was insufficient in the new post-Fordist conditions of uncertainty 
and precarity and could no longer provide a method of domination. Actions in the 
bureaucratic field and the field of power he shows, set in train a model of security 
governance for creating the new late modern subject and enfranchised its agents and 
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civil society for coding habitus into the crime prevention curriculum. Ilan (2010) 
demonstrated how, at street level, this habitus was actively resisted by inner city 
youth who encountered it. 
 
Bowden’s (2014) case study also captures a moment of police morphology where 
state institutions experienced a crisis of territorial governance resulting from urban 
disorder associated with population dispersal and the perpherialization of the working 
class in the city of Dublin. What Bowden’s study freeze-frames for us is the formation 
of social crime prevention, as a mode of security governance that Wacquant (2008) 
had described as marking the formation of a social panoptic. Thus welfare 
institutions, whose mission up to this point was based upon social integration, were 
shown to morph into security organisations (Bowden, 2014). 
 
Subnational Networks: Urban Security and Local Security 
Since the mid 2000s, two key legislative developments have taken place in the Irish 
security landscape that have further pluralised policing institutions: the Private 
Security Services Act 2004 (discussed below) and the Garda Síochána Act 2005. The 
latter saw the establishment of two new mechanisms of police engagement including 
Joint Policing Committees (JPCs) and Local Policing Fora (LPF). JPCs are designed 
to enable engagement between the police, local authorities, elected politicians, NGOs 
and voluntary organisations at municipal or county level. Their primary purpose is 
joint problem solving in the spirit of partnership, albeit that many politicians viewed 
their initial function as police accountability bodies (see Harrington, 2011). The Local 
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Policing Fora are community policing mechanisms at local level typically acting to 
deal with quality of life issues in stressed areas especially those affected most by drug 
related problems. Between them, these two subnational structures have effectively 
created new relationships of exchange and new positions. 
 
Outside of these structures exist new day-to-day relationships between police and 
businesses, citizens, NGOs, local authority officials, elected councillors and members 
of parliament, communities and neighbourhoods. They establish joint projects and 
partnership initiatives to deal with particular security problems like the Business 
Improvement District (BID), local community safety initiatives and ‘assertive 
outreach’ projects: the culmination of which is the cementing of relationships of 
mutual exchange and reciprocity. The Assertive Case Management Team for example 
stemmed from the Lord Mayor’s ‘Safer City for All’ project to create a more ‘vibrant’ 
city by dealing with obstacles posed by drug use and anti-social behaviour. This team 
is managed by a ‘high level’ management network of public and voluntary agencies in 
health services, the police, the City Council (Dolphin, 2016) and thus mobilising an 
urban security network focused upon monitoring and tracking problem drug use in the 
commercial city centre. Urban security is complicit in a type of social cleansing: 
clearing the city for consumption to enable the flow of economic and symbolic capital 
to the dominant commercial and state interests. 
 
With reference to Whelan and Dupont’s (2017) typology, these structures constitute 
both geographical subnational bodies but also have distinct functions depending upon 
the scale of its region. Each local authority area in Ireland has a Joint Policing 
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Committee tasked with co-ordination whereas Local Policing Fora and community 
safety initiatives tend to be engaged in joint problem solving at district and 
neighbourhood levels. However, to cast these various structures as distinct would be 
erroneous – there are intersecting relationships across these bodies with many 
individuals being involved in all. More significantly, many of the same actors are 
involved in the day-to-day problem solving practices that are associated with these 
security assemblages. However they do not supplant the police dominance in the 
field. Rather, as they fall short of devolved police accountability structures, the 
symbolic power of the police remains firmly intact.  
 
The Private Security Industry 
Also in a dominated yet firm position in the security field is private security industry. 
The industry representative body was formed in 1972 with the view of encouraging 
the government to regulate the sector. An industry spokesperson pointed out to the 
author that it was necessary for ‘legitimate’ companies to distance themselves from 
the perception that criminal elements could and indeed had entered the industry. 
Security was seen to operate in a regulatory vacuum and enabled an informal 
economy to thrive given the relative absence of access barriers. This was a time of 
armed conflict over the North of Ireland which lasted for 30 years and formed a 
barrier to any effective recognition of security interests other than the official state 
forces. After the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the eventual 
normalisation of politics on the island, the Irish government finally legislated for 
private security in the form of the Private Security Services Act 2004; and established 
the Private Security Authority to register, license and regulate the industry. The 
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Authority was set up as an agent of the Department of Justice and Equality and hence 
is part of a set of agencies within what’s commonly referred to as the ‘Justice family’. 
Police are firmly represented on the board of the Authority and licenced applicants are 
subject to police screening. 
 
Since its inception the Authority has registered 1,300 security companies and 27,000 
individual security officers (Private Security Authority, 2016). The principal sectors 
of cash in transit, security guarding and electronic (alarm) security were the first to be 
regulated followed by providers of safes, locks / doors / windows, and more recently 
private detective agencies. The board of the Authority is appointed by the government 
and contains representatives from the industry together with representatives of the 
police force, An Garda Síochána. The Authority plays a pedagogic role in raising 
awareness of regulation and new developments to the industry and is regularly joined 
in these activities by representatives of the security industry association. The 
Authority and the industry perceive other players in the field as ‘stakeholders’. Other 
informal relationships exist between the industry association and the national crime 
prevention unit in the police force usually in the form of stakeholder seminars. 
 
Apart from its close relationship with the Authority, the industry also has access to the 
industrial standards agencies within the state and takes part in committees that 
produce and agree the quality standards that are sought by companies. In addition, in 
the electronic sector, the industry has participated in an apprenticeship programme in 
conjunction with the state’s industrial training institutions. State and private security 
industry relations resembles a policy network (see Sorenson and Torfing, 2005) as the 
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industry is an end user and a participant in the formation of state policy, regulation 
and standards. An industry ‘champion’ told the researcher that the industry in general 
recognises the differences between private and public security and does not see itself 
a replacement for the former but is aware that new business opportunities could be 
created should the state decide to privatise aspects of public security. But the industry 
knew its place from the outset and understands that it is in the supply of the police 
field, and hence remains in a dependant and dominated position.  
 
The National Police Crime Prevention Unit and the Security Doxa  
The National Crime Prevention Unit of the Irish police force, An Garda Síochána, is 
centred in the capital city and has a network of crime prevention officers in each 
regional division, serving police districts throughout the country. The esprit de corps 
of the Unit centres on situational crime prevention: to provide advice to householders, 
businesses and property owners on steps they should take in order to protect their 
possessions, land and capital. Advice is given online and by the regionally based 
crime prevention officers. The head of the crime prevention unit on the Garda website 
says that ‘everybody has a role to play in attempting to prevent and reduce crime. 
These pages contain basic information which will help you to improve your own 
security’ (Garda Síochána, 2017). An anti-burglary campaign, Operation Thor, which 
the police initiated in 2016, called upon citizens and businesses to ‘lock up and light 
up’. There is no shortage of the term ‘security’ in police crime prevention literature, 
framed as ‘being a good neighbour’. 
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A security doxa appears to be in train. Such a sensibility appears to reflect what 
Garland (2001) referred to as responsibilisation, whereby citizens are asked to 
provide for their own security. These mobilisations of citizens appear to represent a 
new ‘call to order’ or a pre-reflexive agreement, as Bourdieu (1994: 14) described it 
as ‘a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it presents and 
imposes itself as a universal point of view’. The doxa that is generated underlines the 
situationist habitus of the ‘smart’ who makes accommodations to a new reality that all 
actors should temper their expectations of the state for protection, and that they 
should protect themselves. The security doxa it seems may ultimately constitute the 
security field as it passes into generative systems and forms the habitus based upon 
this apparent security consciousness. 
 
But the security commonsense engendered in this way reaches beyond the ‘states of 
mind’ that Bourdieu (1991) elucidated, and manifest themselves eventually in 
physical space. The Unit advises architects and property developers about the security 
standards it should build into their constructions so as to design-in effective 
protections. Advice leaflets for developers and householders on door and windows 
recommend the choice and purchase of industry standards for security, as endorsed 
by, for example, the European Security Standard IS EN 1627:2011 (An Garda 
Síochána, 2018). In order to position itself within the security field the unit is engaged 
in an exchange of knowledge with the private security industry who are in a position 
then to gain from the flow of economic capital resulting from the purchase of security 
goods.  
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The Government Department and the Bureaucratic Field 
Beyond, above and yet within the system of assemblages rests the Department of 
Justice and Equality which is the common power uniting all of the constituent 
elements of this emerging field. It governs and funds to greater or lesser extent in 
each of these security nodes and constitutes the ‘home’ department for all policing, 
regulatory, and implementation agents in the field.  
 
The Department as the bureaucratic field acts in the field of power, determining and 
organizing the divisions and struggle in the field of security and reflected in its 
patriarchal status as the head of the ‘family’ of crime, justice and security agencies in 
that comprise the field. The officials working there when asked about a security field 
were able to point the researcher towards a variety of potential participants, drawing 
from their own elaborate cognitive map of the various security producers.  
 
Discussion 
Drawing together the cases what can be gleaned at this stage is an emerging security 
field as forming from morphologies in the field of policing as the polity slowly shifts 
towards a more pluralised form of security governance. The field appears to be 
constituted by the melding of policing and security actors each competing for 
economic and symbolic profits. Bourdieu (1993) sets out this dynamic within two 
principles of hierarchization: the heteronomous principle (involving economic capital) 
and the autonomous principle (involving symbolic capital). Economic profits accrue 
to those closest to the field of power: in our case, state funds are necessary for the 
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police forces and to organise the regulatory regime for private gain from security. 
Symbolic profits are those gained based upon the social and cultural value, as 
embodying what dominant players regard as essential to field practice (Bourdieu, 
1993).  
 
The police retain a strong position owing that it retains the vast bulk of state funds 
and is rich in cultural capital: in the case outlined this is connected with its place in 
nation-building. The private security industry is rich in economic capital but low on 
symbolic capital as citizens demand more police within the public sphere. Private 
security is regulated by the bureaucratic field as it sets the conditions under which the 
field can be entered.  
 
The security field articulates with the street field especially within the frame of urban 
security. In the case outlined this is shown at municipal level where security nodal 
organisation unite police, local authorities and commercial interests as a way of 
screening out the ‘destructured classes’ (beggars, the homeless, drug users) from the 
view of ‘legitimate consumers’ (Coleman, 2004). Local or ‘civic’ security which 
takes place at district and neighbourhood levels has a trickle of economic capital but 
may have higher symbolic capital within its own locale. Police bracket this form of 
security as ‘safety’ as it wishes to retain the symbolic power to be gleaned from its 
dominant position in the production of ‘security’. Indeed the police are key 
gatekeepers within the field by serving to filter entry and location: in this way the 
police habitus still dominates the emerging security field, as it retains the right to 
classify and to position others. Just like the historical position of police in England 
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who are rich in symbolic capital and act as a condensing symbol for ‘nation’ (Loader 
and Mulcahy, 2003), so too the Irish police force An Garda Síochána draw from their 
inherited tradition as a symbolic institution.  
 
Outside of these arrangements the role of the central government is critical, acting as 
the bureaucratic field and engaged with the field of power. Writing on the constitution 
of fields Bourdieu (1993) suggested they were organised around a ‘dominant principle 
of hierarchy’ which relates to how economic capital is acquired. The second principle 
of hierarchy relates to field positions based upon cultural capital. Based upon these 
cases it can be said that the state security agencies guard the flow of economic capital. 
As the police field articulates with and shapes the security field by determining the 
kinds of orientations, qualifications and general categorisations of different functions 
of security, it is aligned with the second principle of hierarchy in respect of the flow 
and accumulation of cultural capital. In this way the police field remains dominant 
based upon its symbiotic relationship with the state and its symbolic domination of 
the new space of the security field.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has sketched the ways in which a growing set of security actors are being 
framed as operating within ‘the field of security’ and in ‘multiple level security 
fields’; all as ways of capturing the growing pluralisation of policing and the 
emergence of security assemblages. Fields are competitive arenas and yet they 
involve relations of reciprocity. The field concept has immediate attractions, not least 
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that it helps to frame the contestation for positions and the formation of reciprocal 
relationships, or the exchange of capital, within security networks (Dupont, 2004). In 
addition, critical realist criminologists have drawn our attention to the contestation 
that takes place in the ‘open systems’ involving policing, security and safety (Hughes, 
2007); and the predominance of practice in the professional resistance to the 
imposition of the so-called dominant neo-liberal discourses in crime control (Gilling 
et al, 2013). Thus there is a new space to which the field concept might be deployed 
by criminologists to advance analyses of contemporary mechanisms of governance, 
ordering and control. This forming semi-autonomous space appears to be located 
between the police, bureaucratic and street fields and has a state-supported 
infrastructure helping it to form. The relational nature of Bourdieu’s reflexive 
sociology has considerable merit in mapping and analysing these relational, 
networked systems of exchange and their power relations. 
 
Bourdieu’s concept of field has been used in criminology to analyse changes in 
policing and its effect on habitus, together with framing the range of criminal justice 
actors and offenders occupying the street field. Janet Chan (2004) has made a 
significant contribution to criminology by applying Bourdieusian field theory to 
capture the effects of changing policy on the habitus of police officers. However, 
changes in technology, the onset of globalised society and the transformations 
associated with late modernity, have reshaped challenges and police organisations, 
forging morphologies in the governance of security. Hence the security field concept 
enables the framing of a new symbolic and economic space comprised of the system 
of forces, positions and relationships now taking shape following the fracturing and 
pluralisation police bureaucracies. At the same time it poses methodological 
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challenges in mapping the totality of actor positions and discourses, the role and 
power of inherited tradition, police and informal institutions, and the strategies 
adopted to maximise economic and symbolic capital. In its extant use in criminology, 
and as demonstrated in the empirical cases in this article, security fields can be 
imagined as tangles of policy networks, and relays of government and industry actors, 
communities, political groups and social movements. These new networks and 
assemblages are formed often to target street-based crimes: in this way the security 
field articulates within the street field as identified by Shammas and Sandberg (2015).  
 
A critical drawback for a fully formed field theory of security concerns the idea of a 
security habitus. If the security field is early in its formation, it follows that 
historically constituted habitus has not had sufficient time to evolve. If such a habitus 
were to exist, then it follows that there would be an alignment between what is 
produced and what is consumed. Demand for public rather than private security 
remains higher and early indications in one polity appear to reveal an acceptance by 
private interests of their domination within the field, curtailed by the sense that their 
demands would not be politically tolerated. While these demands potentially win over 
popular support in an economic argument over value for money, it is the symbolic 
power of the police and the legitimacy that they are afforded, that keeps them in a 
dominant field position. That said, some evidence presented here shows how a new 
security doxa is generated on the basis of making citizens more responsible for their 
own security and therefore driving the demand for private security goods. In this 
regard, a win-win coalition appears to be forming where the police and security 
industry exchange social and cultural capital between them. 
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